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Savory: Muslim Perceptions of the West; Iran

Muslim Perceptions
of the West
Iran
Roger Savory

The first Muslim contacts with Europe occurred in
the middle of the 7th century A. D. In 711 A. D., the Arabs seized Gibraltar, and
went on to overrun the Iberian peninsula and cross the Pyrenees into southern
France. Their thrust northwards was checked by Charles Martel at Poitiers in
732 A. D., and for the next three and a half centuries there was a period of uneasy
coexistence between dar al-islam, the "House of Islam," and dar al-harb, the
"House of War," that is, those parts of the world as yet unconquered by Islam.
During this period, corresponding roughly to the early Middle Ages, it is not
possible to perceive a distinctively Iranian attitude toward the West, and the
same is true of the two centuries during which the crusading activity of the West
was at its height, the period between the capture of Jerusalem by the Crusaders
in 1099, and the final expulsion of the Crusaders from the Holy Land in 1291. For
approximately six centuries, Iran had no separate political identity, but was
merged into the larger entity of the Islamic Empire, what Le Strange called "The
lands of the Eastern Caliphate." As far as Arab Muslims were concerned, even
Iran's ethnic, linguistic and geographical distinctiveness was acknowledged only
by the vague and pejorative term cajam, or "non-Arab." From the tenth century
onwards, the Persian language resurfaced in Muslim garb as the medium for a
rich literature consisting primarily of poetry and belles-lettres.
For scientific
writing, however, in the fields of theology, philosophy, medicine, astronomy,
philology, mathematics, and even history, Persian Muslims continued in the
main to use Arabic for about another two centuries. This ensured the widest
possible circulation of their works, since Arabic remained the lingua franca of the
Islamic empire from Spain and Morocco to South-East Asia until about the
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beginning of the 13th century. During the whole of these six centuries, therefore,
it is probable that the average Persian Muslim's perceptions of the West were
similar to those of the average Arab Muslim. It may be noted en passant that
many leading Muslim geographers and scientists during this period were Persians and not Arabs. It would not be necessary to make this rather obvious point
but for the absurd claims of Arab nationalists and their untutored supporters in
the West.
Two interconnected events changed this general picture: the first was the
two waves of the Mongol invasion of the Iranian world in 1219 and 1256; the
second was the destruction of the historical caliphate by the Mongols in 1258
A.D. A number of consequences flowed from the cataclysmic events. The
Mongols destroyed the caliphate, the outward and visible symbol of the unity of
the Muslim world, and adopted a policy of tolerance toward all the major
religions (some might argue that Mongol official policy was based more on
indifference toward the latter). By these actions, the Mongols, no doubt unconsciously, produced a religious climate in which heterodoxy could flourish, and
Persia, long the home of the heterodoxy, benefited from this policy. By establishing an empire in Iran and Mesopotamia which corresponded closely to the
heartlands of the old, pre-Islamic, Persian empires, the Mongols, again no doubt
unconsciously, accelerated the revival of Iranian national identity. It is significant
that one Western chronicler, William Adam, termed Hiilegii imperator Persidis.
As John Boyle put it: "The Mongol was, in fact, mutatis mutandis, as much
Emperor of Iran as the Norman William was King of England" 1 The monopolistic
grip of the Arabic language over Islamic culture was broken, and the Mongol
rulers commissioned Iranian men-of-letters to write histories in Persian. Was this
renaissance of the Persian language and the revival of Iranian nationalist sentiment reflected in a perception of the West which differed from that of other
Muslims? Initially, I think not. To be sure, the monumental history of Bashld alDrrarked a major departure from earlier Islamic historiography. Bashld al-Dln
accepted "the Pax Mongolica as the natural order of things"2 and the breadth of
his historical view included China and India. As far as the West is concerned,
however, his viewpoint was "standard Muslim," "which regarded world history as
the history of the salvation of God's own people—the Muslims—by His revelation." 3
The advent of the 16th century A.D. marks a watershed in Iranian history.
For the first time, the Ithna cAsharI form of Shi'ism became the official religion of
the Iranian state, and it has remained so ever since. This policy, introduced by
the new Safavid rulers of Iran, has had an immense effect on all subsequent
Iranian political and social history. A rapidly evolving Ithna cAsharT ShlcT worldview was superimposed on the standard Muslim world-view, with results that are
still with us today. The rule of the Safavids (1501-1736) coincided roughly with the
heyday of the Ottoman empire, and the adoption of Shi'ism by the Safavids as the
official religion of the state was designed in part to save Iran from being absorbed
into that empire. In this regard the policy was a success. On the other hand, it
made the Sunni Ottomans the arch-enemies of the Safavid state, and, since the
Ottomans lay across the natural lines of trade and communication between Iran
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and Western Europe, the policy had the effect of making Iran, already isolated
from the West by virtue of its geographical position, still further isolated.
The precursors of the Safavids as rulers of Iran, the Turcoman dynasties of the
Black Sheep and the White Sheep, since the geographical locus of their power lay
in the region of Lake Van and in Diyar Bakr respectively, had been in closer
contact with the Ottomans and had therefore adopted at an earlier date the use of
firearms, both hand-guns and artillery. The purchase of these weapons necessitated at least commercial contact with infidels, but cannon, for example, whether
purchased from the Venetians or the Portuguese, were termed indifferently
"Frankish cannon. " For the Safavids, as for the Mamluks of Egypt and Syria, the
chivalrous conduct of war precluded the use of "ungentlemanly" weapons like
firearms, and it required the devastating demonstration of Ottoman fire-power at
the battle of Chaldiran in 1514 to persuade the Safavids to change their minds.
The infidel suppliers of firearms and cannon most conveniently at hand were the
Portuguese, who had recently (1507) arrived in the Persian Gulf under their
redoubtable commander Afonso de Albuquerque. The Portuguese are not identified by name in the contemporary Safavid chronicles Ahsan al-Tavarikh and
Hablb al-Siyar, although there is a reference to the "King of Portugal" (padishah-i
purtuqal) in the former.4
Despite contact with the Portuguese during the 16th century, however,
Iranian knowledge of Western Europe continued to be rudimentary until the
accession of Shah c Abbas I in 1588. The celebrated audience granted in 1562 by
cAbbas's grandfather, Shah Tahmasp, to the English merchant-adventurer Anthony Jenkinson, is well known but may bear repetition here. Jenkinson had
made his arduous way to the Safavid capital at Qazvin via the realm of Tsar Ivan
the Terrible and the Caspian Sea. On arrival at the Persian court, Jenkinson
presented the friendly letter of Queen Elizabeth I, the purpose of which was "to
treate of friendship and free passage of our Merchants and people, to repaire and
traffique within his dominions, for to bring in our commodities, and to carry away
theirs, to the honour of both princes, the mutual commoditie of both Realmes,
and wealth of the Subjects." The Shah received Jenkinson affably until he
discovered that he was not a true believer. His manner then changed drastically;
"Oh thou unbeleever," he said, "we have no neede to have friendship with the
unbeleevers." With this succinct restatement of the classical Islamic view of
infidels, from whatever part of the globe they came, the Shah dismissed Jenkinson from his presence. Further, and this may be called the ShTcT 'added touch,'
the physical presence of an infidel was considered to have ritually polluted the
audience-hall, and Jenkinson, as he left the royal presence, was disconcerted to
notice a servant following him "with a bassinet of sand, sifting all the way that I
had gone within the said pallace." 5 One aspect of this story is of particular
interest: the calm assumption on the part of the Shah (until he was advised
otherwise) that a visitor to his court, even from such a benighted region as
England, would be a Muslim. This, of course, merely demonstrates Shah Tahmasp's ignorance of Europe.
The reign of Shah c Abbas I (the Great) (1588-1629) marked the high point
uring Safavid times as far as contact between Iran and Europe is concerned. The
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Portuguese, Dutch and English, rivals for control of the East Indies trade,
established factories in Iran and the Persian Gulf, and foreign religious orders,
encouraged by the tolerant religious climate prevailing under cAbbas I, founded
convents at Isfahan and elsewhere in Iran. cAbbas I s personal knowledge of
European political affairs was unique among the rulers of the Safavid dynasty. He
could without difficulty distinguish between the various categories of Franks,
although he made no distinction between the Spanish and the Portuguese (there
was no compelling reason why he should, for the thrones of Spain and Portugal
were united at that time). In 1599 he dispatched as his ambassador to Europe the
English gentleman-adventurer Sir Anthony Sherley; Sherley bore letters from
the Shah to the Pope; the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolph II, King of Bohemia;
Henry IV of France; Philip III of Spain; the King of Scotland; the Queen of
England; the King of Poland; the Seigneur of Venice; and the Grand Duke of
Tuscany. cAbbas I, realising that trade with Europe would increase Iran's prosperity, ignored the odium theologicum of the culama and introduced pragmatic
policies granting rights and privileges to infidels. There seems little doubt that,
at least during the reign of cAbbaB I, the Safavid capital was a multicultural
society with little friction between the different ethnic groups. It is a moot point,
however, whether these enlightened policies initiated on the personal authority
of the Shah changed the basic perceptions of the Iranian "man-in-the-street" visa-vis Europeans and the West in general. For Muslims in general, Europeans
were unbelievers, and for Ithna cAsharI ShTcIs in particular, those who professed
the Christian religion were considered to be najis, unclean. Despite the generally tolerant atmosphere prevailing under cAbbas I, Thevenot noted that Christians were not allowed to enter the coffee-houses, or the public baths, in Isfahan,
because they were najis, impure, 6 and that if they were apprehended in the
Masjid-i Shah, they were driven out with cudgels like a dog; however, Thevenot
entered the Masjid-i Shah in the "habit of the Countrey, and received not the
least affront. "7 This perception of Christians as impure occurs with great regularity. For example, there is no doubt in my mind that Shah cAbbas I accepted
the help of the English East India Company in driving the Portuguese out of
Hormuz in 1622 without any qualms whatever; he had been seeking the means of
achieving this since his accession. However, Iskandar Beg MunshT, the author of
the Tarikh-i °Alam-ara-yi cAbbasi, depicts the Shah, as a good Muslim, hesitating about co-operating with infidels: "Shah c Abbas decided to accept the offer of
help made by the English. As the saying goes:
Although the water from the Christian well is impure,
It only washes a dead Jew, so what is there to fear?" 8
The overthrow of the Safavids by the Afghans in 1722 was followed by more than
half a century of bloody civil war between two rival factions: the Zands in the
south and the Qajars in the north. With the eventual triumph of the latter and the
establishment of the new Qajar dynasty in 1795, Iran was once again free to look
at the world outside its borders. This world had radically changed while Iran had
been preoccupied with its own internal affairs, and the period of European
domination of the Muslim world had begun. Two disastrous wars with the
Bussians, and Napoleon's scheme to march the Grande Armee across Iran to
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invade India, made the Persians aware, not only of their military inadequacies,
but of how little they understood of the plot of the play now that they had been so
brusquely thrust on to the stage of world politics. The solution, it was thought, lay
in imitation of the West, and in 1815 the first Iranians travelled to Western
Europe for their higher education. Thus was created a dichotomy in the Iranian
body politic and in the Iranian psyche which is still not resolved; or, to put it more
accurately, the dichotomy which had existed since 1501, when the Ithna cAshari
form of Shi'ism was declared to be the official religion of the Iranian state, was
brought out into the open and resulted in a love-hate relationship with the West
which is more evident than ever in Iran today. This dichotomy derived from the
fundamentally opposed aims and objective of two groups: the culama, and the
Western-educated intellectuals. Stately baldly, the theory of government subscribed to by the culama was that, in an Ithna cAshari Shl c I state, the only
legitimate government was that of the 12th Imam, the Mahdl, a messianic figure
who had been in occultation since 873 A.D. In his continuing absence, the
mujtahid,s, or most eminent jurisprudents, had acted as his representatives on
earth. This theory of government had little practical significance while Iran was
still governed by a Sunn! ruler. Even after the establishment of the Safavid Shl c I
state, with the resulting potential for conflict between the culama and the shah,
the voices of the mujtahids had continued to be muted. The Huguenot jeweller
Jean Chardin, who was present at the coronation of Shah Sulayman in 1666,
explains why:
The clergy, and all the holy men of Iran, consider that rule by laymen
was established by force and usurpation, and that civil government
belongs by right to the sadr and to the church . . . but the more generally
held opinion is that royalty, albeit in the hands of laymen, derives its
institution and its authority from God; that the king takes the place of
God and the prophets in the government of the people; that the sadr, and
all other practitioners of the religious law, should not interfere with the
political institution; that their authority is subject to that of the king, even
in matters of religion. This latter opinion prevails: the former opinion is
held only by the clergy and those whom they supervise; the king and his
ministers close the mouths of the clergy as it pleases them, and force the
clergy to obey them in everything. In this way, the spiritual is at the
moinent completely subordinate to the temporal.9
With the advent of the Qajars, the potential for conflict was realised as a
result of two important changes in the situation: (1) the Qajar rulers had no way of
asserting their own legitimacy vis-a-vis the claims of the 'ulamd; (2) the process of
Westernization was set in train by the increased contacts between Iran and the
West. As Iranians returning from Europe began to circulate ideas of democratic
constitutional government, and as the number of Western-educated intellectuals
in Iran swelled, the culama increasingly perceived the West as the source of unIslamic, and therefore unwanted and dangerous, ideas. At the same time, the
policy of the Qajar shahs of granting sweeping economic concessions to European
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entrepreneurs aroused the always latent xenophobia of the culama. Throughout
the 19th century, therefore, and continuing down to recent times, there have
existed these two diametrically opposed perceptions of the West: the perception
of the intellectuals, that the West is desirable because it is the source of rational
thought, of democratic constitutionalism, of secularism, of the emancipation of
women, and so on; and the perception of the culama, that the West is undesirable
for precisely the same reasons. The perception of the West by the c ulaina as the
source of undesirable ideas was superimposed upon and reinforced their traditional perception of the West as the enemy of Islam.
Some quotations from representative 19th and 20th century Iranian writers
will illustrate these two antithetical perceptions. First, an example of what may
be called 'standard' 'ulamd perception. The writer is an calim named ' All DavanI,
who completed the Persian translation of volume XIII of the Bihar al-Anwar [the
celebrated work in Arabic of the great Safavid theologian and jurisprudent
Muhammad Baqir Majlis! Isfahan! (d. 1110/1699)] under the title Mahdi-yi
Mawcud, 'The Promised Messiah.' In the course of a lengthy (180-page) introduction to his translation (3rd edition, Tehran, 1966), cAli DavanI takes the opportunity to inveigh against Iranologists like E.G. Browne, and historians oflran like Sir
John Malcolm. It is no accident, of course, that the "ulamd should turn their guns
on two Western Orientalists who have added so much to our knowledge and
understanding of Persian culture and history. It is precisely because men like
E.G. Browne, Sir John Malcolm and Sir John Chardin understood Iran so well
that the culama still feel the need to attempt to discredit them.
c All DavanI begins with the splendid exordium that "Muhammad Baqir
Majlisi, in conformity with the tenets of the religious law of Islam, was opposed to
Sufis, idolators, Jews, Christians, and the fellow-countrymen of Edward
Browne " 10 (of course the Englishmen who were contemporaries of Muhammad
Baqir Majlisi became aware that they were the "fellow-countrymen of Edward
Browne" only two hundred years or so after their own death). Browne is attacked
for suggesting that the dominant position in the state achieved by the "great
ecclesiastics" during the reign of Shah Sultan Husayn (1692-1722 A.D.; he was
derisively dubbed "Mulla Husayn" by foreign observers) "hardly made for spiritual unity or national efficiency. " u "In other words," comments DavanI, "he is
saying that the thesis that religion and politics are separate, a thesis which is a
fabrication of the colonial powers and disseminated by propagandists like Browne
and their Iranian lackeys, must be put into effect in Iran!" 12 Browne continued by
saying that the admirers of the "redoubtable" Mulla Muhammad Baqir-i Majlisi,
"the persecutor of Sufis and heretics," "call attention to the fact that his death,
which took place in 1111/1699-1700, was followed in a short time by the troubles
which culminated in the supreme disaster of 1722, and suggest that the disappearance of so saintly a personage left Persia exposed to perils which more critical
minds may be inclined to ascribe in part to the narrow intolerance so largely
fostered by him and his congeners." 13 Browne is attacked again for quoting with
approval Krusinski's reference to the religious tolerance of Shah cAbbas II
(1642-66): "he openly protected the Christians, whom he would not have in the
least molested for their religion, saying, 'That none but God was master of their
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consciences; that, for their own part, he was only governor of externals; and that
all his subjects being equally members of the State, of what religion soever they
were, he owed justice to them all alike.' " 1 4 One may note in passing that only one
of three leading mujtahids was prepared to support Article 8 of the Supplementary Fundamental Laws of October 7, 1907, which enunciated the principle of
the equality of all Iranian citizens before the law. Malcolm is similarly attacked for
implying that the fall of the Safavid capital to the Afghans in 1722 was the result of
the dominance of the Safavid administration by the religious classes, and for
praising Shah cAbbas I for encouraging Armenians and other Christians to play a
larger role in the Safavid state. Davani's concluding blast is directed at E.G.
Browne for showing undue interest in heterodox movements such as Babism.
The reason is clear, says Davani: a strong Ithna cAsharI religious establishment in
Iran would be a hindrance to the economic and political schemes of the colonialists, and so Browne, by belittling the religious establishment and espousing
the cause of Babls, Baha'is and Azalis, was not devoid of political motives. From
this it is but a short step to DavanT's conclusion that Browne was not a friend of
Iran, as his apologists maintained, but an agent of British Intelligence. 15 This
type of polemic lives on today in the rhetoric of Ayatullah Khumayni, who has
included 'Western Orientalists' among his categories of'enemies of the people.'
Second, the impressions of the West gained by Nasir al-Dln Shah and various
Qajar princes during visits to Europe in the 19th century: Nasir al-Din Shah paid
three visits to Europe during that century—in 1873, 1878, and 1889—and he left
a diary on the occasion of his first two visits. 16 Redhouse, in his Preface to his
translation of the 1873 Diary, credits the Shah with "an especially keen talent of
observation," 17 but this is hardly borne out by his diaries. Perhaps Redhouse
thought that comments like the following showed great discernment:
The nobleness, the greatness, the gravity and sedateness of the women
and men (of England) shine out from their countenances. One sees and
comprehends that they are a great people, and that the Lord of the
Universe has bestowed upon them power and might, sense and wisdom,
and
enlightenment.18
Although the Shah thought that, when one had seen one city in Firangistan,
one had seen them all, 19 he was aware of sharp differences between nations and
peoples in Europe. For example, on crossing the border from Germany to
Belgium, he exclaims:
What a difference has the All-Wise and Almighty Creator placed
between
the two nations and the two countries!. . . . In one moment a total change
came over the people, the language, the religion (sic!). . . the tongue of
all is French, the people more tranquil, the arrangement and uniform of
the troops and citizens utterly different . . . they are chiefly of the Romish
faith. This nation has more liberty than is enjoyed in Germany.20
Nasir al-Dln Shah had a novel solution to the problem of the Jewish diaspora:
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The celebrated Rothschild, a Jew also, who is exceedingly rich, came to an
audience, and we conversed with him. . . . 1 said to him: 7 have heard
that you brothers possess a thousand crores (10 billion) of money. I
consider the best thing to do would be that you should pay 50 crores to
some large or small state, and buy a territory in which you could collect
all the Jews of the whole world, you becoming their chiefs, and leading
them on their way in peace, so that you should no longer be scattered and
dispersed." We laughed heartily, and he made no reply.21
Of far greater interest are the accounts of the residence of three Qajar princes
in England in 1835-36. 22 The princes were all sons of Husayn cAll Farman-Farma
and hence grandsons of Fath cAli Shah Qajar, whose death in 1834 was followed
by a disputed succession in which these princes were involved; the purpose of
their journey to England was to solicit aid and protection from that country.
These diaries, particularly that of Riza Qull Mlrza, reveal most interesting
perceptions of the West on the part of these princes of widely differing character
and temperament. 23 There were numerous British officials in England at this
period who had served either the Government of India or that of Whitehall in
Iran, so the princes did not lack for escorts who were familiar not only with their
country but in many cases with their language. However, considerable British
involvement in Persian affairs since the beginning of the 19th century had
apparently made no impression on Riza Qull Mlrza, because the latter, on
meeting at Bath Sir John Henry Willock, a sometime instructor to the Persian
army and former British ambassador to Iran, commented:
I was extremely astonished as to how it could be that in this foreign land
someone should turn up who not only knew Persian but knew it well.24
Lord Palmerston at first suspected that the Qajar princes had come to
London with the idea of challenging the succession of Muhammad Mlrza, who
had proclaimed himself shah on 9 November 1834. After Lord Palmerston had
been assured by "Maknll Khan" (Sir John McNeill, for fifteen years British
ambassador in Tehran) that Vail Mlrza, one of the three brothers, was not plotting
seditious activity in Iran, he called on Vali Mlrza and from then on London
society was open to the princes. They were escorted to the Waterloo Day
celebrations by another former British ambassador to the Persian court, Sir Gore
Ouseley, who later invited them to his London residence and subsequently to his
country house, which he had purchased four years previously at a cost of
£150,000. Riza Qui! Mlrza was particularly impressed by Sir Gore's library of
works in Arabic and Persian, a library "such as few rulers of Iran" had possessed.
He was informed that Sir Gore had spent £15,000 on one Persian manuscript
alone, which he acquired in India. 25 Invitations from aristocracy and royalty
followed thick and fast: Riza Qull Mlrza was visited by Lord Palmerston, and
attended a reception given by the Prime Minister, Lord Melbourne; he was
received at the homes of Lord Salisbury; of Sir John Hobhouse, the former
British ambassador to India; of Sir James Carnac, Chairman of the English East
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India Company; and of the aforementioned Sir John Henry Willock, who had
lived in Iran for twenty-one years, spoke excellent Persian, and whose children
wore Persian dress in honour of their visitor. The climax came with an invitation
to visit H.R.H. Princess Victoria at Windsor, following which the Princess sent
her portrait to the princes and asked that they write a few lines to her in Persian,
and with an audience with the King (William IV). Biza Qui! Mlrza notes in
passing that the King of England has no legislative powers. In view of the
continuing Iranian aversion to Freemasons, whom they consider to be a branch of
British intelligence, Biza Qull Mirza's comment after he had visited the Duke of
Sussex, a brother of the King and grand master of the Freemasons, is of interest:
"It seemed to me that if a person observed the rules and customs of Freemasonry,
he would acquire many benefits from religion and this world." 26 Biza Qui! Mlrza
was recalled to a consideration of Islam by a visit to the house of Muhammad
IsmaL!l Khan, the ambassador of Nasir al-Dln Haydar, the ruler of Lucknow
[King of Awadh/Oudh (1827-37)]. The wife of the latter complained to Biza Qull
Mlrza that she had left India intending to perform the pilgrimage, but had now
been detained in London for fourteen months "in association with infidels." 27
She found comfort in visiting Biza Qull Khan and reading passages from the
Qur'an to him. Possibly this episode may have put the prince in mind of his own
religious duties, for he purchased a pump for shipment to Najaf so that pilgrims to
that Shlci shrine might pray for him. 28
The diary of Biza Qull Mlrza is chiefly of note, however, for a lengthy (pp.
510-586) discourse on the geography of England and on the manners and customs
of the English. The geographical section begins in a manner reminiscent of
Caesar's De Bellico Gallico; "The English realm consists of three islands (sic):
England, Scotland and Ireland." His ignorance of the existence of the Welsh is
surprising in view of the furor stirred up in the Persian capital by Sir Harford
Jones only a few years earlier! The course of English history is telescoped in
rather remarkable fashion:
At all events, at an earlier period, according to what is recorded in their
chronicles, the people of Farangistan, especially the English, were beasts
and animals and had no arts and crafts. Mostly they lived on the
seashore, and in defiles of the mountains; they wore the skins of animals,
and the food of the majority was vegetation. If a king appeared
among
them, it was not long before they killed him; sometimes the king gained
the upper hand and slaughtered large numbers of them. In general, there
was hostility between the king and the people, and oppression and
tyranny occurred on an excessive scale, and the people of those parts . . .
scattered to the New World and other islands in the ocean but found no
rest.29
By some process which the prince does not explain, things improved, and
now:
In every city of England which we visited . . . the people are so
and behave in such a measured way, that they have no governor
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authority, for they have no need of a governor, and there is no
among them. Just and upright conduct are themselves the final
and the determinant of important matters, and complete
freedom
in that country.30

For how long had the English been in this blissful state? For about 250 years, that
is, since the reign of Elizabeth I. Before that, they had been "animals and
beasts." 31 Obviously it was not Riza Qull MIrza's perception that freedom in
England had slowly broadened down from precedent to precedent! However,
Riza Qui! Mlrza had no doubt that freedom existed in the West. "It is impossible,"
he wrote, "that oppression should occur in a European country," and he contrasted this freedom with the oppression and enmity which were well-known in
the countries of Asia and the lands of the East (bilad-i mashriq). The later history
of Europe notwithstanding, Riza Qull Mlrza had grasped a basic truth about
Western civilization. In this respect, his perception stands in stark contrast to
that of a member of the Iranian religious establishment who also visited Europe
during the 19th century and whose views will be described shortly.
Riza Qull MIrza's perception of the system of education and the level of
literacy in England was also rather idealistic, but not altogether inaccurate:
Their children are taught perhaps twenty subjects in various
languages,
and not one moment of time is wasted. According to them, to waste time is
a most evil characteristic [an accurate description of the Protestant work
ethic!] . . . In the entire population, some twenty-seven million, it is
impossible that a single soul shoidd not be able to read and write, unless
he be blind from
birth.32
Riza Qull Mlrza comments with considerable perspicacity on English upperclass society:
The inhabitants of that realm [England] are sensitive and quick to take
offence. Most of their elegant wives and womenfolk are more delicate and
more fine than a rose-petal. Without exaggeration, their waists are
narrower than a ring on one's finger, and their nature is delicate and
quick to take offence (zud-ranj). However, they conduct
themselves
politely in social intercourse. Even though they are daggers-drawn (dar
kamal-i khusumat) with one another, they still preserve the rules of
etiquette. If they are intent on destroying one another, they speak to each
other with great politeness. Abuse is never (God forbid!) used. The worst
insult is if one person accuses another of lying. This is the most deadly
insult. Of course, if someone wants to destroy another, he may utter such
a charge and accuse him of lying; then that encounter will lead to murder
[the Prince proceeds to talk about the practice of duelling]. 33
The English do have some faults. They "place great emphasis on displaying
their virtues and on self-advertisement, to such an extent that anyone who
possesses some trifling virtue or merit invokes a thousand different means to
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display his merit and advertise it. Love of worldly status is extremely strong
among them, and, unlike the people of the East, they do not strive to show
hospitality and to entertain strangers. They are very alien and aloof. As long as
they see no advantage in an affair, they will not lay out a single dinar-, but if they
do see some advantage, they do not begrudge the spending of crores. Even
though the benefits of that expenditure do not accrue for a hundred years, they
will still go ahead." 34
However, the English are not guilty of ignoring the poorer classes:
They make every effort in charitable expenditure and aid to the needy and
orphans. A person who has an annual income of 1,000 tumans spends 50
tumans on the poor.35 As a result of high prices and the shortage of
foodstuffs, the poor are numerous—perhaps
out of 27 million people, 7
million are poor and needy persons—but not one of them begs for a
living; in the whole country not a single beggar exists. Penalties are
imposed for begging. In every quarter there is a poor-house, to which the
poor can repair, and where a reliable superintendent, with several
attendants, ministers to the needs of the poor. Every year the sum which
is paid from charitable funds in respect of each person is allotted to the
superintendent, and dispensed on a daily basis for the food and clothing
of the poor, and every month an accounting for this money is made to the
general
public.36
It is clear that the princes, and Riza Qull Mlrza in particular, had enquired
intelligently into many aspects of English life, and their perceptions, though
somewhat out of focus, were far from superficial. The same cannot be said of the
perceptions of our third Iranian traveller to Europe during the 19th century.
Hajji Muhammad cAli PIrzadeh was a Sufi who made two trips to Europe: in 1860
and 1886. He was persona grata with the Iranian Establishment and with the
Shah himself, partly, we are told, because of the "unassailable purity of his spirit,"
and partly because of "the neatness of his dress and his personal cleanliness." 37
Hajji PIrzadeh shared a murshid (spiritual director) with the Iranian ambassador
to the Sublime Porte. He may be called, therefore, an "Establishment Sufi." On
some matters, his views coincided with the standard c'ulama perception. For
example, Paris was a den of vice, and he hoped a way could be found to prevent
Iranians from going there. 3 8
May God have mercy on our Iranian youths who come to Paris and see its
external glitter and are lost, and abandon both the prescriptions and laws
of their religion, its dogmas ('aqlda), moral and ritual purity, the fear of
God, and performance of the Islamic rituals and prayers. They do not
know what to do, since they imagine that if they drink wine and eat pork
and crab and do not perform their ablutions or their prayers, and do not
tell the truth, they will become as wealthy and powerfid as most Franks.
May God curse those who condemn a whole nation on the basis of the
behaviour of Iranians
abroad!39
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For Hajji Plrzadeh, the vaunted freedom of Europeans was nothing more
than sexual licence, again, a standard perception of the c ulama:
The word 'freedom' in the countries of Europe, and especially in Paris,
denotes 'the freedom of women with men,' so that no one will take offence
whatever anyone does. The reality of this freedom' is loss of honour and
chastity, for no one has control over his wife. If a woman wants to have
an affair with a strange man, she is free to do so. Her husband
cannot
object or prevent her. Why? Because that woman is free,' and
Farangistan is the home of freedom! So the meaning of freedom is the
exercise of free will on the part of women in regard to female
unchastity—
otherwise, people have absolutely no freedom in Farangistan, and have no
freedom of action. For example, if someone runs fast in a side-street,
the
police seize him and ask him why he is running fast. And if a person
walks slowly, the police will ask him why he is walking so slowly! The
collars and cuffs of one's shirt must be changed every day, and if they are
slightly soiled the person cannot leave his house if he has no money to
have them laundered. At the table, he must sit in such and such a way,
and eat in a certain manner, and place his knife on the right-hand side of
the place and fork on the left, and if he does the opposite it is a 77iajor
fault; and he must eat and drink in such and such a way, and eat this dish
before that, and that before this, and if a person eats them in the wrong
order great exception is taken, and people criticize him and stare at him.
For example, one must not eat cheese before the meat, or
vegetables
before the cheese. Everything has its special order, and if a person
departs from the normal order, he is
criticized.40
In other words, because people in polite society in Europe conformed to the
whims of social fashion, etiquette, table manners, and so on, in Hajji Pirzadeh's
opinion they could not be regarded as free. Since Hajji Plrzadeh was a Sufi, one
regrets that no one was on hand to explain the situation to him in the classic Sufi
manner in terms of the zahir, the exoteric phenomena which appear to be the
reality, but are not, and the batin, the hidden esoteric reality, vouchsafed only to
the initiated.
Hajji Plrzadeh found himself among the guests at a party given by the Iranian
ambassador in London, Mlrza Malkum Khan, in honour of the British Prime
Minister and other members of the government. Hajji Plrzadeh met such
luminaries as Sir Henry Rawlinson (the eminent Assyriologist (1810-1895)), who
described himself facetiously as a "cracked walnut" (jawz-i shikasta) and an "old
dervish," and he had a fascinating conversation with Gladstone himself, who
tried to find out on the basis of his experience with the Sudan, why dervishes
were so militant. Hajji Plrzadeh replied that dervishes were of various types: for
some, the Sufi Path meant holy war and the proselytization of others; for others, it
meant seclusion and prayer; for yet others, travel. The true dervish, he said, was
he who was unencumbered by the world and its appurtenances. Gladstone said:
"People who go to the Sudan and are captured by the dervishes, have their
84
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clothes ripped off and replaced by a long shirt. 'Now,' say the dervishes, 'you are a
dervish too.' " Hajji PIrzadeh replied that the wearing of a shirt did not make one
a dervish. "So what is being a dervish?" demanded Gladstone. "Self-discipline,
war against the carnal soul, and the refining of one's characteristics," replied Hajji
PIrzadeh. Gladstone then asked about dervishes in India: "Why do they inflict
wounds on their bodies and commit violence on themselves?" Hajji PIrzadeh
replied: "They follow the Hindu faith; the faqirs and dervishes of Islam do not
behave in this way."41
Hajji Pirzadeh's perceptions of the West thus lay between the two poles of
the "satanic" perception of the culama, and the "rosy" view of the intellectuals. In
some of the extracts quoted above, he voices the conventional, superficial culamd
perception of the West. But, since he mixed with government circles, and
obviously had pretensions to being a literary man, his views on occasion were
closer to those of the intellectuals. For example, he also was interested in the
incidence of literacy:
The inhabitants of Paris and of the whole of France, both men and
women, rich and poor, upper and lower class, are literate and can write,
and know something of geography, arithmetic, geometry and other
sciences which men need.42
He could appreciate, too, Western scholars who had demonstrated an interest in
Islam and in Iran. This again sets him apart from the standard view of the culama,
who have neither curiosity about Western scholarship nor interest in those in the
West who study and attempt to understand Islam (except as targets for abuse).
Hajji Pirzadeh's appraisal of E.G. Browne makes an interesting contrast to the
views of c AlI DavanI quoted above. E.G. Browne, whom he calls mester browni,
was twenty-five years old at the time. He was, says Hajji PIrzadeh, "an extremely
intelligent, wise and cultured young man. He had acquired a good knowledge of
Persian, and spoke Arabic well and elegantly, and also knew Turkish extremely
well. . . . He has a strong predilection for Oriental languages and for the Islamic
faith." Here lies the clue to Hajji Pirzadeh's benevolent attitude toward E.G.
Browne: he hoped that the latter would become a convert to Islam. "Because of
his predilection toward Islam, his intelligence and his educational accomplishments, I gave him the title of Mazhar-i cAlI, 'the Manifestation of c All.' If
Almighty God wills it, by virtue of the blessings conferred on him by this blessed
name, may he find guidance and direction on the straight path of the Islamic faith
and the religion of Muhammad (the blessings of God and peace be upon him!)." 43
With the advent of the 20th century, little changed as regards Persian
perceptions of the West. Throughout all the turbulence of the Persian Revolution
of 1905-11, the use of an unwilling Iran by the Great Powers as a cockpit of war in
World War I, and the subsequent reign of Riza Shah (1925-1941), the basic
dichotomy between the perception of the culamd, for whom the West was a sink
of corruption and the source of unwanted ideas, and the perception of the
intellectuals for whom it was a panacea, persisted. It was not until after World
War II that some of the intellectuals, too, finding that the application of Western
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remedies by those who frequently had but a superficial understanding of them,
did not cure all Muslim ills, and unwilling themselves to accept the idea that
along with democratic freedoms go duties and responsibilities, joined forces with
the culama in a chorus of denunciation of the West. But this was "une trahison des
clercs." The intellectuals posed as allies of the religious classes, as supporters of
Khumaynl's Islamic state, in order to overthrow the late Shah in 1979. They
adopted protective Islamic coloration. Pro-KhumaynT Western-educated Iranians like Banl-Sadr were careful not to wear ties, because the term kiravati ("a
person who wears a tie"), is a term of derision and abuse applied to Westernized
intellectuals. Since few, if any, of the intellectuals of the National Front, the
former supporters of Dr. Musaddiq, really wanted an Islamic state, but wanted
instead some form of secular state, they have suffered from ideological schizophrenia. They have been unmasked as Westernizers in mullas' clothing, and both
they and Iran have paid the penalty for their folly.
About eighty years ago, at the time of the Constitutional Revolution in Iran,
one of the leaders of the Constitutionalists, Sayyid Hasan TaqTzadeh, expressed
the view of many of his supporters when he declared: "We must Westernize
ourselves, body and soul!" Similar sentiments were expressed by intellectuals in
many parts of the Middle East at that time. As Bernard Lewis has written:
The West was great and strong; by study and imitation, it might
possible to discover and apply the elusive secret of its greatness
strength, and generations of eager students and reformers toiled
search. They may not have loved its, or even understood us, but
admire and respect us. Today they usually do neither.44

be
and
in the
they did

When the importation of Western political ideas and programmes for economic
development not only failed to usher in the millennium, but actually brought
social disruption and political fragmentation to the Middle East, disillusionment
set in. Since it is human nature to take the credit oneself for the good that occurs,
and to blame someone else for the evil and unpleasant happenings and for the
mistakes which are committed, the intellectuals did not find too much difficulty
in perceiving the West, formerly the source of all good, as now the source of all
evil. In order to sublimate their frustrations, it was satisfying to vent their rage on
the West. This transformation in their perception of the West naturally brought
the Iranian intellectuals ever closer to the religious classes, in whose world-view
xenophobia had been an unchanging element. In Iran, since the late Shah had
identified himself with a policy of Westernization and rapid modernization, he
became the target on the one hand for the resentment produced by rapid social
change, and on the other for the frustration felt by the intellectuals of the
National Front when it proved impossible instantly to transplant Western ideas of
liberal democracy into a traditional Islamic society. In their eagerness to overthrow the Shah, the National Front intellectuals could not resist the temptation
to make use of the tremendous populist appeal of the mullas at the grass-roots
level of society. In allying themselves with the culama, the National Front
intellectuals ignored the lessons of modern Iranian history. They ignored the fact
86
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that the aims and objectives of the vulama and of themselves were poles apart.
They forgot that the temporary alliance between the c 'ulama and the radical
intellectuals during the constitutional movement in the early years of this
century, had fallen apart the moment the "ulama realized what the secularizing
aims of the intellectuals meant in concrete terms. Most disastrous of all for their
fortunes, the intellectuals forgot, if they had ever understood, that in Iran there
are only two symbols to which the masses will rally: the throne and the mosque.
When the former was overturned, the loyalty of the masses was transferred to the
latter, and the Islamic Republic of Iran came into being.
What I have called the "standard culamd perception of the West" has not
changed through all the political vicissitudes which Iran has experienced this
century. In 1907, at the time of granting of the Persian Constitution, a mulla in
Artillery Square (maydan-i tupkhana) in Tehran harangued the crowd as follows:
If ye drink wine, if ye give yourselves up to gambling and adidtery,
murder, and every form of crime, the All Merciful will pardon you, but
Allah keep you from becoming partisans of the Constitution, friends of the
friends of the Majlis! Rather, do ye kill them in as great numbers as
possible! Kill especially the young men, who have drawn their education
from European sources; kill whosoever weareth a starched collar and
carrieth a stick! For such a one is a follower of the Europeans and their
devilries, and the law requires that he shall be killed!
As he spoke, the mob shouted: mashruta namikhvahim; azadi
namikhvahlm
("We do not want a Constitution! We do not want freedom!"). As he spoke, the
mulla's eye fell 011 the gleaming white, starched collar, the "standard of the
Constitution," of a young man who had just emerged from the Baharistan, the
parliament building. "With his finger, the mulla pointed out to the crowd the
hated emblem," and in a flash the crowd had torn the young man to pieces;
another innocent bystander suffered the same fate. 4 5 Today, nothing has
changed. In his work on Islamic Government, KhumaynT explains that he is
opposed to democratic constitutional governments, because under such governments there tends to be a lack of that obedience 011 the part of the people which
"facilitates the State's responsibilities." The "poisoned cultures and thoughts" of
the West, he says, must be eradicated. 46
Iranian intellectuals, if they are to survive, will sooner or later have to come
to terms with the West. Xenophobia, which is the product of the resentment felt
at the intrusion into one's own culture of an alien culture, has served both the
National Front intellectuals and the c ulama as an admirable weapon to use in
mobilizing a rootless urban proletariat against "the Great Satan. " As the basis for
one's relations with the other members of the community of nations, however, it
is counter-productive and, ultimately, self-destructive.
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